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INTEREST ACQUIRED BY PURCHASER AT
FORECLOSURE OR EXECUTION SALE
What is the nature of the interest acquired by a purchaser of
real estate at a foreclosure or execution sale in the state of Washington?l
In Atwood v. McGrath,2 by a divided court, the Supreme Court
of Washington, in a departmental decision, held that a sheriff's
certificate of sale does not vest title, is "nothing more than a
chattel real or chose in action," and can, therefore, when community
property, be validly assigned by the husband alone without his
wife's signature. In so holding, the court said.
"Whatever may have been inferred in Diamond v. Turner, 11 Wash. 189, 39 Pac. 379, cited by appellant, this
court has long and consistently held that a certificate of
sale executed by a sheriff does not vest title, being at
most but evidence of an inchoate estate that may or may
not ripen into an absolute title. See Singly v. Warren,
18 Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066, 63 Am. St. 896, and cases
therein cited, Cochranv. Cochran, 114 Wash. 499, 195 Pac.
224, 198 Pac. 270, and cases there cited, Ford v. Nokomis
State Bank, 135 Wash. 37, 237, Pac. 314."
"Under the foregoing decisions, therefore, and our
statutes, the certificate of sale issued to McGrath was
nothing more than a chattel real, or chose in action, at
most, of which, as the husband of the community, he had
the sole management and control, and could sell, assign
and dispose of as he saw fit." 3 (p. 408)
Attention is especially directed to the language of the court that
it has thus "long and consistently held," because the only object
of the present discussion is to set forth what the court has said
upon this subject, not so much for the purpose of laying hare the
somewhat striking inconsistency that at all stages of the court's
history appears in its reports on this subject, but to point out that,
in view of the contrariety of opinion on this point, Atwood v.
McGrath, supra, can probably not be regarded as the last word on
this frequently important subject. This appears so particularly
IThe situation is the same whether a sale or execution under an ordinary money judgment or a sale under decree of foreclosure Is involved,
sales in both cases being made under the same statute. State ex rel. Steelq
V. N. W & P & H. Bank, 18 Wash. 118, 50 Pac. 1023 (1897) Hardy V. Her-

riot, 11 Wash. 460, 39 Pac. 958 (1895)

Debenture Corporation V. Warren,

9 Wash. 312, 37 Pac. 451 (1894) Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 1121, Rem. Comp.
Stat. secs. 578-604.
137 Wash. 400, 242 Pac. 648 (1926).

1Italics ours.
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because of the fact that in that case only one decision was cited to
the court on the point in the briefs by each of. the respective parties, 4 notwithstanding the many cases (some rather obscurely hidden 5) in which the point has been touched. These will now be
taken up chronoldgically, and the court left largely to speak for
itself.
In Murray v. Meade,6 the court said
"It is not the confirmation that gives the equitable title
to the land, but it is the purchase at the execution sale
and the payment of the purchase price according to the
terms of the sale. If the proceeding had been regular
up to the time of and including the sale, the equitable title
would pass to the purchaser. The confirmation is really
only the announcement of the legal determination of these
facts." (P 693)
In Debenture Corp. v. Warren,7 the court said
"It is contended upon the part of the respondents that
the title does not pass until the expiration of the time for
redemption, and that under the general rule the right to
possession would not accrue until such title passed. That
such is the law in the absence of any express statutes
upon the subject is conceded. But we have an express
statutory provision * * * And under it we must hold that
the purchaser is entitled to possession from the day of
sale." (P 314.)
In a later case, State ex rel. Steele v. N W & P H. Bank,8 hereafter quoted from, the court construes the foregoing case to have
held that title passed prior to the expiration of the redemption
date.
In Hays v. Merchants Bank of Port Townsend,9 the court said.
"The statute, Gen. Stat., See. 2172, gives to owners of
the lands abutting on tidelands the preference right to
purchase, and it cannot be maintained that the respondents
'The appellant in his brief cited only Diamond v. Turner 11 Wash.
189, 39 Pac. 379 (1895) and the respondent cited only Ford v. Nokomi's
State Bank, 135 Wash. 37, 237 Pac. 314 (1925).
5An effort has been made to find every Washington case in which the
point has been touched. It will be obvious from reading the following
pages that many cases have from time to time been overlooked as the point
has arisen, largely so, undoubtedly because in many instances the point
is not adequately digested and discoverable only by indirect methods of
research and in some instances by good luck only
5 Wash. 692, 32 Pac. 770 (1893)
*9 Wash. 312, 37 Pac. 451 (1894)
* 18 Wash. 118, 50 Pac. 1023 (1897)
' 10 Wash. 573, 39 Pac. 198 (1895).
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were owners of the land covered by their certificate at
any time prior to their receiving a deed. A judgment
debtor, until after the expiration of the time to redeem
real estate sold on execution, is the holder of the legal
title, and must in all respects be treated as the owner of the
land. Freeman, Executions, see. 323, Dray v. Dray, 21
Or. 59, 27 Pac. 223, McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365,
(70 Am. Dec. 655), Curtis v. Millard, 14 Iowa 128, (81
Am. Dec. 460)." (P 577)
In Diamond v. Turner,0 the court said.
"t * * but it does not follow that no title was acquired
by the purchaser at the execution sale. The certificate of
purchase and confirmation of sale were alone essential
to pass the substantial title of the defendant in the execution to the purchaser at the sale. The execution of the deed
after the time for redemption had expired was a purely
ministerial act on the part of the officer, and could have
been compelled by the purchaser, or those claiming under
him, at any time in a proper proceeding for that purpose.
Until the sale had been set aside, a certificate of purchase
would be as fully protected as though the legal title had
been conveyed by deed made in pursuance of the statute."
(P 192.)
In Hardy v. Herrwtt," the court said.
"It follows that in this state the title of the mortgagor
upon foreclosure sale, like the title of the judgment
debtor upon execution sale, becomes extinguished and all
that remains to him is the right to redeem, which is wholly
statutory Independent of the statute, the mortgagor or
judgment debtor would have no right to redeem from the
sale. Rorer, Judicial Sales, (2 ed), see. 1148, Freeman,
Executions (2 ed), see. 314, Stoddard v. Forbes, 13 Iowa
296, Weiner v. Hesntz, 17 Ill. 259, 3 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence, see. 1228, Spoor v. Phillips, 27 Ala.
193.
"The purchaser at such sale acquires the full legal title,
carrying with it possession and the right to the rents and
profits. The statute which gives to the debtor or mortgagor the right to redeem prescribes the time within and
the terms upon which he may do so, and upon compliance
with its provisions he becomes reinvested with the title. A
purchaser at an execution sale acquires all the estate and
interest of the defendant in execution, he succeeds to the
title of the defendant in execution. All that remains
in the debtor is the mere personal right secured by statute
2011 Wash. 189, 39 Pac. 379 (1895).
n 11 Wash. 460, 39 Pac. 958 (1895).
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to repurchase the land within the time allowed by statute,
and thus become restored to the estate he had in it at the
time of the sale. This statutory right to redeem from the
sale is essentially different from an equity of redemption. It is merely a privilege which the statute affords the
debtor to be exercised in the manner pointed out by the
statute, and, unlike an equity of redemption, it is not an
estate in lands subject to levy and sale upon execution.
"
Parmer v. Parmer,74 Ala. 282.
"The purchaser becomes the absolute owner of the land,
and, entering into possession, is entitled to the rents and
profits, and the former owner has nothing but the naked
right of redemption, which is irretrievably lost if it be not
asserted in the time and manner prescribed by law Spoor
v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 193, Kannon v. Pillow, 7 Humph.
281." (P 462.)
Knspe v. Austin 2 involved the same question as Hardy v. Herrott, supra, and that court accepts the results of that case, over
the vigorous dissent of Chief Justice Hoyt, but adds
"Now, there has been a good deal said as to the announcement in Hardy v. Herrwtt of the doctrine that the
title of the judgment debtor became extinguished by the
sale of the land, and that all that was left to him was the
equitable right to redeem, and that the purchaser at such
sale acquired the full legal title, carrying with it possession and the right to rents and profits. Many cases sustain the doctrine therein announced, but the decision of
that technical question was not necessary to the decision of
the real question involved in Hardy v. Herrzott, and it is
not necessary to the decision in this case. It is a substantial benefit that is granted by the legislature, VIz.,
the right to the possession or the right to the value of
the possession under certain circumstances, and the legislature has as much power to bestow that benefit upon the
purchaser with the legal title remaining in the redemptioner as it would if the legal title passed from the redemptioner to the purchaser at the time of the sale. The
discussion of the title proposition is the discussion of a
theory, and does not affect the practical fact that the legislature, regardless of the question of title, has conferred
this right. So that we do not think it at all necessary to
discuss that question here." (P 193.)
In Hays v. Merchants' National Bank," on rehearing of same
case previously quoted from, the court said.
"This same question, viz., the right of the purchaser to
' 13 Wash. 189, 43 Pac. 25 (1895)
14 Wash. 192, 44 Pac. 137 (1896).
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receive the rents of the land during the time between the
sale and the redemption, again came before this court
in the case of Knipe v. Austin, 13 Wash. 189 (43 Pac. 25),
and it was again held that the right to the rents and
profits accrued to the purchaser. But it was announced
m that case that the technical question of whether or not
the title of the judgment debtor became extinguished by
the sale of the land, and that all that was left him was the
equitable right to redeem, and that the purchaser at such
sale acquired the full legal title, was not necessary to the
decision of the real question involved in Hardy v. Herrtott, and that it was not necessary to a decision in the
case then being considered, that it was a substantial
benefit that was granted to the purchaser, viz., the right
to the possession, or the right to the value of, the possession, under certain circumstances, and that the legislature
had as much power to bestow that benefit upon the purchaser with the legal right remaining in the redemptioner
as it would if the legal title passed from the redemptioner
"
to the purchaser at the time of sale
"The rights acquired by the purchaser are statutory
rights, the right of the owner to redeem is equally a
statutory right. It must be confessed that either theory
is surrounded by difficulties, for it would seem that there
is no particular virtue in a sheriff's deed, but that under
a statute like ours, which. provides that the purchaser
shall go into possession and receive the rents or the value
of them, the thing which was sold was actually sold at
the time of the execution sale, and the redemption was
stmply a purchase back under the provstons of the statute.
On the other hand, it destroys the plain and evident meaning of the statute which grants the right of redemption, if
an incident to the land is to be separated from it or destroyed by the sale, and cannot be redeemed, as would
be the case here. The rig]it to purchase the tide land
in front of the upland is a valuable right incident to the
upland, it is attached to the land.
"So that, whatever technical expressions may be used
concerning the title passing from the judgment debtor to
the purchaser, the substance of the statute must be considered, and we must hold that where the statute gives
the judgment debtor the right to redeem that which was
sold, it is a whole and effectual redemption which is provided for and not a redemption of a portion, or of the
land itself stripped of valuable mcidents, appurtenances,
attachments, or whatever technical name may be applied
"
to this incidental right.
"For these reasons, and believing that in substance there
is no conflict between the original decision in this case
and the decision in Hardy v. Herriott, and Knipe v.
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Austin, supra, the former ruling will be adhered to and
the judgment reversed."'" (P 103.)
In that case the question involved was whether the right to purchase tidelands existed in a purchaser at an execution sale of the
uplands prior to the expiration of the statutory period of redemption. The court held not, although it is submitted that a more
satisfactory view and one in full harmony with the earlier (and
later) cases might have been taken.'
In State ex rel. Steele v. N W & P & H. Banki6 the court said
"Counsel for respondent cites the case of Debenture
"Italics ours.
'5 The court in the Hays case elected the view that the purchaser at the
sale did not acquire the preferential right to purchase tidelands before the
period of redemption expired, but that it remained in the judgment debtor.
The court chose this view on the ground that otherwise, in the event of
redemption, the judgment debtor might find the tidelands in front of his
uplands indefeasibly vested in the purchaser at the sale. On the other
hand, it would seem that the court did not consider the equally unfortunate
consequence of the view adopted by it, namely that if the preference
right to purchase tidelands is to be regarded as vested in the judgment
debtor during the period of redemption, and judgment debtor did not
redeem, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale might find himself the owner
of the uplands with the tidelands in front of him indefeasibly vested in the
judgment debtor.
It is submitted that the unfortunate consequences of either of these
views might have been logically avoided by saying that since the preferential right to purchase tidelands is a statutory incident to the ownership
of the uplands, the sheriff's sale conveyed the preferential right, defeasible
only by redemption, to the purchaser at the sale, and that if the judgment
debtor redeemed, he became "restored to his estate" including the incident
preferential right to purchase tidelands, and that if during the redemption
period the purchaser at the sale had exercised the preferential right, the
judgment debtor, in the event of redemption by him, might equally redeem
the tidelands upon paying the sale price of the tidelands plus the rate of
interest thereon fixed by the redemption statute. This view would protect
the purchaser at the sale against the consequences of non-redemption, and
would protect the judgment debtor in the event of redemption, and would
not make the possible exercise of the preference right during the period
of redemption an instrument of harm. This view appears strictly logical
because, while the tidelands were not actually sold at the foreclosure sale,
it could properly be held that the preferential right to buy them was (See
theory of Tibbets v. Bush & Lane Piano Co., 111 Wash. 165, 189 Pac. 996,
1929) and should therefore be subject to redemption in either its exercised or unexercised form. While it is true that the court has held that
the right of redemption cannot be burdened by requiring more than the
statutory redemption price to be paid (State ex rel. Bryant v. Starwch,
131 Wash. 101, 229 Pac. 12, 1924), still by paying the statutory redemption
price for the uplands, the debtor would be restored to his estate," including the preferential right of purchase, which, if it had previously been
exercised by the purchaser he could easily protect himself, pursuant to a
suggestion on p. 108 of the case just cited, by an equitable proceeding in
which he tendered the consideration paid plus the proper rate of interest.
It is to be expressly noted, however, that the Hays case does not take
the view that no title passes, but only that whatever interest passes, the
preferential right to purchase tidelands does not pass.
1"18 Wash. 118, 50 Pac. 1023 (1897) See text relating to footnote 8.
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Corporatwn v. Warren, 9 Wash. 312, in support of his
position. The contentions m that case were that the title
did not pass until the expiration of the time for redemption, and that see. 519, supra, was not applicable to sales
under mortgage foreclosures. Both of these contentions
were decided in the negative."
That case involved the point whether the purchaser's right to
possession dated from the date of sale or from the date of confirmation. The court held that the first date was right.
In Singly v. Warren,'7 the court said.
"A certificate of sale executed by a sheriff does not pass
title. At most it is only evidence of an inchoate estate
which may or may not ripen into an absolute title. While
the purchaser at a judicial sale may be entitled to the
immediate possession and the rents and profits of the premises, he cannot be said to hold the title until he receives
a deed in pursuance of the sale. Hays v. Merchants' National Bank, 14 Wash. 193 (44 Pac. 137), Reynolds v.
"
Harris,14 Cal. 667, Roberts v. Clelland, 82 Ill. 541.
"To hold that the respondent Tindall in this case has a
good title to the prenuses in dispute would be to hold that
his grantor was able to convert a defeasible into an indefeasible estate by the mere instrumentality of a conveyance. If the owner of a determined fee conveys in fee,
the determinable quality of the estate follows the transfer.
4 Kent. Commentaries, 10." (P 445.)
The foregoing case is the one that was cited by the court m the
recent case of Atwood v. McGrath, supra,and has occasionally been
cited in the interim, but without regard to the last quoted paragraph which recogmzes a "defeasible estate", or a "determinable
fee" as passing. Moreover, Hays v. Merchants' National Bank,
supra,the only Washington case cited in support of the first quoted
paragraph, obviously does not support it, as appears from the quotations herein previously made from the Hays case. At any rate,
Singly v. Warren has been often ignored between then and now,
as will hereafter appear.
In Board v. First Presbyterian Church, the court said.
"A number of authorities are cited by both appellant
and respondent, as to when the legal title passes and as to
whether the legal title to land passes upon the sale or upon
the confirmation of sale. It was said by this court in some
1118 Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066 (1898).
Italics ours.
"19 Wash. 455, 53 Pac. 671 (1898).
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of the cases cited, notably Hays v. Merchants' Bank, 10
Wash. 573 (39 Pac. 98), that the discussion of the title
proposition was a discussion of a theory and did not affect
the practical questions m that case, and so we think concerning that techmcal question here." ' 20 (P 462.)
In Dane v. Daniel,21 the court held that both husband and wife
were necessary parties to a foreclosure of community property,
and that a proceeding against the husband alone was abortive.
The reasoning is that the wife's interest cannot be "sold" without
her being a party The court said
"The principal reliance of the respondent, however, is
upon the contention that the title of the appellants passed
by the original foreclosure proceedings and sale thereunder, leaving in them, if anything more than their statutory right to redeem, the right only to their day in court
to contest the liability of the property to be sold for the
satisfaction of the mortgage debt.
"The distinction is, that in the one line of cases it is held
that the wife must be made a party and given an opportunity to defend, before the community property can be
sold to satisfy the debt, while in the other, it is held that
the property may be sold without her being joined in any
of the proceedings prior to the sale, but that the sale is
open to contest by her." (pp. 388, 391.)
In De Roberts v. Stiles, 2 - the court said
"If title had passed by the sheriff's sale to a purchaser,
that would undoubtedly be true. In that event all rights of
the second mortgagee or his assignee would have been forever barred. But that is not the case presented here. When
Fry took the title to this land by the quitclaim deed from
Stiles, he stood in Stiles' shoes in all particulars, so far
as his relation to this land was concerned. At the time
Stiles deeded to Fry, he (Stiles) had the right to redeem
from the mortgage sale, and by so doing the effects of the
sale would have been determined, and he would have been
restored to his estate, 2 Hills' Code, See. 515. This court
has said in Singly v. Warren, 18 Wash. 434, 445 (51 Pac.
1066, 1069, 63 Am. St. Rep. 896),
'A certificate of sale executed by a sheriff does not pass
title. At most, it is only evidence of an inchoate estate,
which may or may not ripen into an absolute title.'
"In any event, aside from the question of where the title
Italics ours.
2123 Wash. 379, 63 Pac. 268 (1900).
24 Wash. 611, 64 Pac. 795 (1901)
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rests during the redemptionary perwd, the section of the
status above cited provides for a complete restoratwn of
the estate upon redemptwn being accomplished. The estate
stands as if no sale had ever been made. Stiles, by his deed
to Fry, transferred his right of redemption to Fry, and
when Fry redeemed, the estate was restored, as if no sale
had been made." ' 23 (p. 618.)
It is plain from the italicised language in the foregoing
quotation that the court expressly leaves the question open.
In Knowles v. Rogers,2 4, the court said.
"He also knew that the sale had not been confirmed,
and that until such confirmation no deed could be made.
Until then the legal title remained in the respondent.
Hays v. Merchants' Bank, 10 Wash. 573 (39 Pac. 98),
Hays v. Merchants' National Bank, 14 Wash. 192 (44 Pae.
137) " (p. 217 )
In PhiladelphiaMtge. & Trust Co. v. Palmer,25 the court said.
"While the court has had some difficulty in its attempts
to define the status of such a purchaser with relation to
the title to the land purchased, it construed the statutes as
giving hun all the benefits of ownership, even holding that
he was not required to account for the rents and profits received between the time of sale and the subsequent redemption of the property therefrom by the original owner.
Debenture Corporatwnv. Warren, 9 Wash. 312 (37 Pac.
451), Hardy v. Herrott, 11 Wash. 460 (39 Pac. 958)
Knipe v. Austin, 13 Wash. 189 (43 Pac. 25), Hays v. Merchants' National Bank, 14 Wash. 192 (44 Pac. 137)-, State
ex rel. Steele v. Northwestern & P H. Bank, 18 Wash. 118
(50 Pac. 1023), Diamond v. Turner, 11 Wash. 192 (39
Pac. 379)
"A proceeding which, if valid, will give to an execution
purchaser of land a substantial title, as well as all the
rights and privileges which follow title, ought, when invalid, if pursued in good faith under a belief and claim
of right, to give color of title sufficient to start in motion
the statute of limitations.' '26 (pp. 463, 464.)
In McManus v. Morgan, 7 the court said.
"When appellant purchased the real property upon
mortgage sale, he became entitled to the possession
1 Italics ours.
2127 Wash. 211, 67 Pac. 572 (1902).
'332 Wash. 455, 73 Pac. 501 (1903).
21Italics ours.
21 38 Wash. 528, 80 Pac. 786 (1905).
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thereof. Laws 1899, p. 93, sec. 15. He thereby acquired
all the title to the mortgaged property which the mortgagors had. This title could be defeated only by redemption, or another sale, but, until a resale or redemption,
the purchaser was for all purposes the owner. He certainly had a valid, subsisting interest in the property In
Diamond v Turner, 11 Wash. 189, 39 Pac. 379, this court
said
" 'Until the sale had been set aside, a certificate of
purchase would be as fully protected as though the legal
title had been conveyed by deed made in pursuance of
the statute.'
"This language is particularly applicable to this case."
(p. 532.)
In that case an action was brought to remove an alleged cloud
on plaintiff's title to real estate five days after the plaintiff became
the purchaser of the lands at a mortgage foreclosure sale, and
before the appellant was entitled to a deed. The court held that
in that case the plaintiff fell squarely within the provisions of
the statute providing that "any person having a valid subsisting
interest in real property and a right to the possession thereof may
recover."
In Hyde v. Heaton,28 the court, in an opinion by Judge Dunbar,
said
"So that the pertinent question here is, not whether a
lien obtained by a judgment has expired, but what interest
in the land was conveyed to the creditor by the sale of the
land by proceedings subsequent to foreclosure. Confirmation is simply the judicial sanction by the court of the sale,
completing the legal transaction. It does not have the
virtue of the sale itself, but is judicial evidence of the
sale. It relates back to the time of sale, and supplies all
defects excepting those founded in want of jurisdiction
or in fraud. If the sale was made without jurisdiction, it
could not be cured by confirmation. So that it is the
legal sale and payment of the purchase price which gives
the equitable interest to the purchaser, and not the confirmation, which is more of a ministerial act. It, therefore, follows that the purchaser has more interest than
that of a mere lien on the land sold, and that the statute
prescribing the duration of liens and judgments does not
affect him." 9 (p. 437-8.)
The language here used is squarely contrary to that used in the
43 Wash. 433, 86 Pac. 664 (1906).
Italics ours.

FORECLOSURE AND EXECUTION SALES
later case of Cochran v. Cochran,30 and is predicated squarely on
Morrow v. Moran, supra, and Dtamond v. Turner, supra. After
discussing the cases just mentioned, the court conttnues.
"Under these authorities the respondents had an equitable interest in land and, although confirmation of the
sale was necessary to complete the legal title, the equitable
title existed and could not be affected by lapse of time
In Carrollv. Hill Tract Imp. Co.,3' the court said.
"Pending the redemption period the certificate of sale
did not pass title, but it was only evidence of an inchoate
interest which might or might not ripen into title. Singly
v. Warren, 18 Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066, 63 Am. St. 896."
(p. 574.)
In Young- v. Daws,32 the court said.
"By his purchase at the foreclosure sale, the purchaser
Fish acquired the full equitable title in the property,
which could only be defeated by a redemption from the
sale within the year permitted by statute, by the mortgagor
or his successor in interest. The title became absolute
in Fish on the failure to redeem within the time, and
descended to his heirs on his death, and was acquired by
the respondents by their deeds from such heirs and became
perfected in the respondents by the deed from the sheriff.
"The fact that a predecessor in interest of the appellant
entered into possession of the land for a time, and made
improvements thereon, does not affect the respondents'
title. Doubtless such acts tended to show good faith on
the part of the purchaser, but the good faith of either
party is not in question, it is a question of the superior
title, and we hold the superior title to be with the
respondents.
"Stang v. Redden, 28 Fed. 11, is a case in point on
all of the questions presented here. It was there held
under a statute similar to our own that the judicial confirmation of a foreclosure sale vests in the purchasers the
full equitable title to the mortgaged premises, whether any
deed is executed and delivered to the purchaser or not."
(p. 507 )
In Merz. v. Mehner,13 the court said.
0 114 Wash. 499, 195 Pac. 224 (1921).

144 Wash. 569, 87 Pac. 835 (1906).
2250 Wash. 504, 97 Pac. 506 (1908).

367 Wash. 135, 120 Pac. 893 (1912).

See text to footnote 38.
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"The sale under the foreclosure, of course, conveyed the
whole title subject to redemption. The right of possession
and the reits passed also to the purchasers. Rem. & Bal.
Code, see. 602. The other case, Merz v. Mehner, is conclusive of the question there presented, or which might
have been presented. The record here shows that the
plaintiffs themselves have not redeemed their interest in
the property from the foreclosure sales." (p. 138.)
In State ex rel. Peel v. Clausen,34 the court said
"The company became the purdhaser at the sale, and
now holds the legal title subject to redemption." (p. 168.)
In Virges v. Gregory Co., 5 the court said
"But even under that redemption statute, the decisions
of this court hold, in effect, that the purchaser's title
did not become absolute until the expiration of the period
of redemption. Hays v. Merchants' Bank of Port Townsend, 10 Wash. 573, 39 Pac. 98, Hays v. Merchants' Nat.
Bank of Port Townsend, 14 Wash. 192, 44 Pac. 137, Carroll v. Hill Tract Improvement Co., 44 Wash., 569, 87 Pac.
835." (p. 339.)
It will be observed that this case merely says that "the purchaser's title did not become absolute;" it does not say that no
title passed.
In Cogswell v. Brown,86 the court said
"But under our holdings that the legal title will not
pass until after the period of redemption has expired and
the execution of a sheriff's deed, the rule was inconsistent
and the law readily adapted itself to the theory that one in
possession should account." (p. 627 )
In Tibbetts v. Bush & Lane Piano Co., 8 7 the court said

"It is apparent that the Bush & Lane Piano Company
had succeeded to all the rights of the original mortgagors
in the mortgaged property George v. Butler, 26 Wash. 456,
67 Pac. 263, 90 Am. St. 756, 57 L. R. A. 396. The original
mortgagors had no further interest therein except a right
to redeem." (p. 168.)
In Cochran v. Cochran,"' the court said.
"It has become the well settled law of this state that a
"94 Wash. 166, 162 Pac. 1 (1917)
97 Wash.333, 166 Pac. 610 (1917).
' 102 Wash.625, 173 Pac. 623 (1918)
111 Wash. 165, 189 Pac. 996 (1920)
114 Wash.499, 195 Pac. 224 (1921).
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mortgage, unlike a mortgage at common law, does not vest
title in the mortgagee, but only creates a lien upon the
land in favor of the mortgagee as against the interest of
the mortgagor; and that a foreclosure sale of the land
looking to the satisfaction of the mortgage debt creates no
greater interest in the land in the purchaser at such sale,
during the period allowed by statute within which the
mortgagor may redeem. In other words, the mortgagor is
not, by such sale, divested of his title to the land prior
to the expiration of the redemption period, and can even
then be divested of his title only upon his failure to redeem
during that period. Rem. Code see. 597, Hays v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 14 Wash. 192, 44 Pac. 137, Singly v.
Warren, 18 Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066; 63 Am. St. 896,
De Roberts v. Stiles, 24 Wash. 611, 64 Pac. 795, Carroll
v. Hill Tract Imp. Co., 44 Wash. 569, 87 Pac. 835.
"It seems plain, therefore, that the legal title to this
land and the whole thereof at all times in question remamed in appellant, and that respondent did not in any
sense purchase any part of the land or the legal title
thereto by furnishing and paying a portion of the redemption money as above noticed.' ' 39 (pp. 503-4.)
This language is contrary to what was said in Hyde v. Heaton,
supra, and a number of other intervemng cases.
In Oregon Mortgage Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 40 the court
said.
"The status of a purchaser at execution sale while the
property is still subject to redemption has been discussed
in several cases. In Hyde v. Heaton, 43 Wash. 433, 86 Pac.
664, it was held that the equitable title passes by the sale,
and the subsequent confirmation and deed confer the
legal title, and that the statute relative to the duration of
the judgment lien would have no further application to the
purchaser after the sale. This case in no way overrules
the previous case of Hays v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Port
Townsend, 14 Wash. 192, 44 Pac. 136, wherein it was held,
modifying the previous case of Hardyv. Herrwtt, 11 Wash.
460, 39 Pac. 958, that the relative rights of the purchaser
and the former owner are whatever the statute gives, and
the mortgagor was held to still be the holder of the legal
title during the period of redemption, to the extent that
he and not the purchaser would be entitled to the preference right to the purchase of tide lands given by statute to
the owner of the upland." (pp. 188-9.)
In State ex rel. Bryant v. Starwich,41 the court said.
Italics ours.

40122 Wash. 183, 210 Pac. 385 (1922).
"131 Wash. 101, 229 Pac. 12 (1924).
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"The case of Hardy v. Herrwott, 11 Wash. 460, 39
Pac. 958, is also cited, and an excerpt from the opinion is
quoted. The excerpt quoted bears only remotely upon
the question here involved, but, aside from this, the principle it announces is no longer the law of this jurisdiction.
See INspe v Austin, 13 Wash. 189, 43 Pac. 25, 44 Pac.
531, Hays v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Port Townsend, 14
Wash. 192, 44 Pac. 137 " (pp. 108-9.)
It is plain from the cases cited that all of the later cases to the
contrary were overlooked, and, further, that the effect of the
cases cited was not stated with entire accuracy
In Inch v. Strohm, 42 the court said
"There was an actual severance before the foreclosure
sale was had, and it cannot be successfully argued that any
vestige of title passed before such sale, if, indeed any then
passed-a questwn we are not now called upon to discuss
or dectdc. See Cochran v. Cochran, 114 Wash. 499, 195
Pac. 224, 198 Pac. 270, and cases there cited."4 3 (p. 493.)
The question in the foregoing case is left open.
In Sandberg v. Murphy,44 decided two weeks later, the court, in
affirming the judgment, said.
"Appellant insists that respondents have no greater
right to the property involved than they had as mortgagees, that they have an inchoate right by the foreclosure
of the mortgage which may or may not ripen into
title.
"To sustain these contentions appellant cites several of
our cases where we have held that a mortgage does not
vest title in the mortgagee but only creates a lien, that a
certificate of sale executed by a sheriff under a mortgage
foreclosure does not vest title, and a person holding a
sheriff's certificate of sale is not the owner within the
meaning of the terms of an insurance policy requiring notice of change of ownership, citing Singly v. Warren, 18
Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066, 63 Am. St. 896, Cochran v.
Cochran, 114 Wash. 499, 195 Pac. 224, 198 Pac. 270,
Oregon Mortgage Co. v. HartfordFire Insurance Co., 122
Wash. 183, 210 Pac. 385.
"These cases are not applicable to a case arising under
a statute defining and granting the right to recover pos"134 Wash. 490, 236 Pac. 88 (1925).
13Italics ours.

" 134 Wash. 685, 236 Pac. 106 (1925).
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session of an interest in or title to, real estate. Rem. Comp.
Stat. see. 785.
"Respondent and the trial court relied largely upon
the case of McManus v. Morgan, 38 Wash. 528, 80 Pac.
786." (p. 687.)
The court then quotes with approval from McManus v. Morgan,4 5 supra, the following"9C
When appellant purchased the real property
upon mortgage sale, he became entitled to the possession
thereof. Laws of 1899, p. 93, see. 15. He thereby acquired
all the title to the mortgaged property which the mortgagors had. This title could be defeated only by redemption, or another sale. But, until a resale or redemption,
the purchaser was for all purposes the owner. He certainly
had a valid, subsisting interest in the property In Dsamond v. Turner, 11 Wash. 189, 39 Pac. 379, this court said.
'Until the sale had been set aside, a certificate of purchase
would be as fully protected as though the legal title had
been conveyed by deed made in pursuance of the statute.'
This language is particularly applicable to this case.
"So it is here, the holder of the sheriff's certificate of
sale under the mortgage foreclosure certainly has a valid
subsisting interest in the real property and the right to
possession thereof and may recover the same." 46 (p. 688.)
And again the court said.
"The extent of the right of the record owner, MvicCormick, at the time would be that if he redeemed from the
mortgage foreclosure sale which alienated the property
from him, he could maintain the same lnd of an action
that his alienee under the mortgage foreclosure has under
the statutes cited in McManus v. Morgan, supra. The
reasoning and principle announced sn that decision are
sound, the law governing the right of action is the same at
present, and there is no reason for a departure therefrom."14 7 (p. 689.)
In the foregoing opinion Dtamond v. Turner, supra, which was
supposedly repudiated, and McManus v. Morgan, supra, are fully
approved.
In Ford v. Nokomis State Bank48 (decided nine days after the
"5See footnote 27.
" Italics ours.
'1 Italics ours.

135 Wash. 37, 237 Pac. 314 (1925).

The suggestion is here advanced

that the result reached upon the problem before the court in that case
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preceding case, and opinion by the same judge), the court said
"The contrary is true in this state, for in this state we
have consistently held from Singly v. Warren, 18 Wash.
434, 51 Pac. 1066, 63 Am. St. 896, to Cochran v. Cochran,
114 Wash. 499, 195 Pac. 270, that a certificate of sale
executed by a sheriff does not vest title, that at most
it is only evidence of an inchoate estate that may or may
not ripen into an absolute estate. While a purchaser at
a judicial sale may be entitled to the immediate possession,
and rents and profits of the property, he cannot be said to
hold the title unless he holds a deed in pursuance of the
sale." ' 49 (p. 45.)
The italicized words in the foregoing quotation overlook many
of the cases subsequent to Singly v. Warren, and prior and subsequent to Cochran v. Cochran.
The foregoing quotation undertakes to distinguish the California and Montana cases, in which it is held an execution sale
vests the legal title in the purchaser.
And the last case in which the point has been mentioned is the
recent one of Atwood v. McGrath," with which this discussion was
commenced, and, in which, in an opinion by the same judge who
wrote the two preceding cases, the court said
"Whatever

may have been inferred in Diamond v.

(viz., that the grantee of the redemption right after execution sale holds
the property, upon redemption by himself, subject to farther sale under the
deficiency judgment against the debtor, because the "successor in interest is
subjected to the same legal results and burdens as the judgment debtor
would be subjected to," and because the grantee "stood exactly in the
debtor's shoes") can be sustained without in any way denying that a
defeasible title or determinable fee was acquired by the purchaser at the
sale (although the court appears to think the two inconsistent). When
the property is sold and a deficiency judgment taken against the debtor,
it is suggested that the purchaser acquires a determinable fee, leaving only
the right of redemption (the option to repurchase, which may be also
regarded as an interest in land, Crowley v. Bryne, 71 Wash 444, 129 Pac.
113, 1912)
The deficiency judgment remains a lien upon all the real
property of the judgment debtor, and, therefore, remains a lien on the
right of redemption. True, the right of redemption cannot be sold under
this lien, but that is only because the statute forbids it until the right is
exercised, but that prohibition is not inconsistent with its existence in a
suspended state until the right of redemption is exercised, at which time
it may be enforced. Hence the grantee of the redemption right acquires
it subject to the deficiency judgment lien, which upon redemption may be
exercised against him. The foregoing suggestion appears a satisfactory
explanation of why the grantee of the redemption right holds it subject
to all of the burdens that it is subjected to in the judgment debtor, his
grantor.
," Italics ours.
0137 Wash. 400, 247 Pac. 648 (1926), decided six months after the two
preceding cases. See footnote 2, supra.
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Turner, 11 Wash. 189, 39 Pac. 379, cited by appellant,
this court has long and consistently held that a certificate
of sale executed by a sheriff does not vest title, being at
most but evidence of an inchoate estate that may or may
not ripen into an absolute title. See Singly v. Warren, 18
Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066, 63 Am. St. 896, and cases therein cited, Cochran v. Cochran,114 Wash. 499, 195 Pac. 224,
198 Pac. 270, and cases there cited, Fordv. Nokomis State
Bank, 135 Wash. 37, 237 Pac. 314." (p. 408.)
And the court holds, with only two judges concurring in the
opinion, and one expressly dissenting on this point but concurring
in the result, and another concurring in the result only, -that a
husband alone can assign a certificate of sale without his wife's
signature.
It is submitted that, aside from the many subsequent cases that
appear to be in conflict with it, the statement from Singly v. Warren, supra, has been misapprehended by the court. Clearly in the
light of the rest of the sentence, the clause "does not vest title"
means "does not vest absolute or indefeasible title." This is, furthermore, particularly emphasized by the second paragraph quoted
earlier in this discussion from Singly v. Warren, and since then
overlooked, in which the court uses the words "defeasible estate"
and "determinable fee," thus indicating clearly that the word
"title" previously employed was used in the sense of "absolute
title" and not in the sense of "no title at all."
The foregoing review of the cases shows that right down to
the most recent times the court has entertained all shades of opinion on this subject, holding that at a foreclosure sale (a) legal
title passes subject only to a right of redemption, (b) that equitable title passes, (e)that a substantial interest passes, (d) that "a
valid subsisting interest in real property" passes, (e) that no
title passes, and (f) varying views as to when title passes,
whether it passes at the sale, at confirmation, at the expiration of
the period of redemption, or at the giving of the sheriff's deed
subsequent to such expiration.
It is not the object of this discussion especially to advocate any
one of the views that have heretofore been entertained by the
court, but primarily to point out that in the light of the foregoing
review, the question can hardly be deemed to be finally settled. It
is suggested, however, that to hold that no title to real property
passes at the sale is contrary to all commonly accepted notions of the
legal effect of a sale. The statutes 5' dealing with the sale of propRem. Comp. Stat., sees. 578-604.
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erty under execution and redemption, throughout use the words
"sale of property," and the sheriff is instructed "to sell real
estate."
Section 584 provides that "upon the sale of real property under
execution, decree or order of sale, when the estate is less than a
leasehold of two years' unexpired term, the sale shall be absolute.
In all other cases such property shall be subject to redemption
as hereinafter provided." The distinction is between an absolute
sale and a sale of property subject to redemption. The ordinary
meaning of "redemption" according to the dictionary definition
is "repurchase."
Such a sale, therefore, is subject only to a statutory right of repurchase, the statute giving the debtor an option
for one year to repurchase the property from the purchaser at the
sale. In ordinary meaning a right or option of repurchase certainly
recognizes some lind of a title in the person against whom the
option is held.
Moreover, section 590 provides that the highest bidder at the
sale "shall forthwith pay the money bid to the officer."
The
statute then contemplates a cash sale. In other instances a cash
sale passes the title at the moment of sale. It seems a strained
construction to hold that a transaction in which the sheriff sells
"property" and the purchaser immediately pays the entire consideration, no title to real property passes to the purchaser.5 2
Section 594 provides that "property sold subject to redemption
may be redeemed." That is to say, the property itself may be
repurchased. Under section 597 the certificate of sale given pursuant to section 584 is entitled to record, as is also the certificate
of redemption in case a redemption is made. It appears that the
sheriff by issuing the certificate of purchase acts as the statutory
agent"3 of the debtor to sell and convey the property, and that m
issuing the certificate of redemption the sheriff acts as the statutory agent of the purchaser in reconveying from the purchaser to
the redemptioner. These certificates, thus construed, satisfy all of
the requirements of a conveyance of real estate.
5

2Even Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 223 Pac. 29 (1925), recognizes
that in the case of an ordinary real estate contract, an equitable title passes
upon full payment of the consideration prior to the delivery of the deed. A
sheriff's sale presents even a stronger situation because the "sale" is for
cash without any antecedent "contract of sale."
"The term "agent" is here not used in its technical sense as one acting
with authority express or implied, from the principal. The sheriff acts
as an agent of the law to do that which the parties would not voluntarily
consent to do like a commissioner appointed by a court to convey real estate
where a party refuses to do so. See Rem. Comp. Stat. sees. 605-611.
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Section 597 further provides that the judgment debtor shall
have one year from the date of sale "to redeem the property,"
that is, to "repurchase" the property
It is further provided in the same section "if the judgment debtor
redeem, the effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to
his estate." The last quoted sentence providing that the debtor
shall be restored to his estate certainly appears to contemplate that
he lost something by the sale.
The Supreme Court of Montana m McQueeney v. Toomey,5 '
having before it the identical language just quoted, held that the
purchaser at the sale acquires legal title subject to the right of
redemption, using the following language"It will be noted that our Code specifically says 'If the
debtor redeem, the effect of the sale is terminated and he
is restored to his estate.' This language is significant, and
we feel that we might almost base our decision upon it
alone."
Section 600 provides that the purchaser is entitled to the rents
and profits until redemption, but he is now (under an amendment
of the early law of this state) required to account in the event
of redemption. 5
Section 602 gives the purchaser possession "from the day of
sale until redemption."
Section 603 provides that the sheriff shall give "a deed of conveyance of the real estate so sold immediately after the time for
redemption from the sale has expired." It is this last section
which in some of the early cases is regarded as negativing the
notion that any title passes prior to the expiration of the period
of redemption because, it is suggested, otherwise the sheriff's deed
would be a mere idle act if title passed prior thereto. This argument does not appear to be well taken, inasmuch as during the
period of redemption, the purchaser holds, to use the language
1'36 Mont. 282, 92 Pac. 561 (1907).
05This change, however, is not inconsistent with the defeasible title
theory, as has been supported. See CogwelZ v. Brown, supra, 102 Wash. 625,
173 Pac. 623, 1918). As a matter of fact, it is entirely consistent with
it, even more so than the early cases holding that there is no duty to
account, in the event of redemption. It is because his title is defeasible
that he must account in the event of redemption. The duty of the purchaser to account is no more inconsistent with the defeasible title or conditional fee theory, than the judgment debtor's being in possession during
the year of redemption. See Pollard v. Harlow, 138 Cal. 390, 71 Pac. 454
(1903), the last case quoted from in the text of the above article. See next

footnote.
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of Singly v. Warren, supra, a "defeasible estate" or a "determinable fee." Upon the expiration of the period of redemption the
sheriff's deed evidences that the determinable fee (a title subject
only to the statutory option to redeem or repurchase) has become
absolute.
The foregoing analysis is directly supported by the decisions m
the State of California, where the statute expressly provides that
the purchaser at the sale acquires legal title. The Supreme Court
of California in Pollard v. Harlow,5 expressly decided that there
was nothing inconsistent between the statute giving the purchaser
the legal title at the time he receives the sheriff's certificate of sale,
and the statute requiring the sheriff at the expiration of the year
of redemption to give a deed. The court did so in the following
language
"The language of section 700, Code Civ Proc., is that
upon the sale of the property 'the purchaser is substituted
to and acquires all the right, title, interest, and claim
of the judgment debtor thereto,' which is to say unequivocally that he acquires the legal as well as the equitable
title. The only qualifications are that (when not a leasehold of less than two years' unexpired term) the property
shall be 'subject to redemption,' that a deed shall be subsequently given (Code Civ Proc. see. 703), and that pending the time for redemption the possession shall remain
with the defendant (Code Civ Proc. sec 706)
But no
one of these qualifications -is inconsistent with the 'vesting of the legal title in the purchasers. With regard to the
first, the case is simply the familiar one of a legal title
defeasible upon the happening of a condition subsequent,
and, as to the second, the deed gives 'to the purchaser
no new title to the land purchased by him, but (is) merely
evidence that the title has become absolute.' Robinson v.
Thornton, supra (102 Cal. 680, 34 Pac. 120) Nor is the
continued possession of the land by the judgment debtor
any more incompatible with the existence of the legal
title in another than in the ordinary case of a tenant and
his landlord. '7
The foregoing analysis would seem fully to answer the argument made in some of the early Washington cases based upon
the postponement of the execution of the sheriff's deed until after
the expiration of the period for redemption, and is entirely in
harmony with that portion of Singly v. Warren, supra, in which
-138 Cal. 390, 71 Pac. 454 (1903).
" Italics ours.
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the court speaks of "a defeasible estate" and "a determinable fee,"
although Singly v. Warren m later times appears to be used (intermittently only, however) as foundation for an argument that no
title passes to the purchaser.
In conclusion, it is merely observed that the preponderating
weight of the Washington cases, appears to be in favor of the conclusion that real property is "sold" at the sale and a determinable
title thereto acquired by the purchaser, and against the conclusion
that the certificate of purchase is merely "a chose in action,"
as held in the recent case of Atwood vs. McGrath, supra, and it
may be hoped that the divided opinon of the department of the
court in that case on this subject may ultimately be thoroughly reviewed by the court en banc.2s
AL'iiRE J. ScHWFPPE.*

Is While rules of property should not be lightly disturbed, yet a series
of conflicting opinions can hardly be said to establish a rule of property.
In any event, the court has not hesitated to resolve similar conflicts in
rules of property by a thorough reconsideration. Schramm, v. Steele, 97
Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634 (1917).
* Of the Seattle Bar* formerly Dean of the School of Law, University of
Washington.

